She's a Savvy Investor

Posts Tagged ‘about’


Posted on February 24, 2012 - by

ok this is a question for evryone about colege?

what would you prefer to do

take a collegee course you loved (in my case photography and music)
or take a course that you hate but may offer more money (in my case business)

also is it fair for a parent to force there child to do a course they hate because my parents are forcing me to study business but i hate it
they say its for my own good but i cant see myself doing it as a career

i love music and photography but they say only dropouts choose creative courses are they right.


Posted on December 24, 2011 - by

virgin’s strategy about growing business for fun?

i got case study about virgin.i don’t know. how is virgin’s business goin for fun?


Posted on December 13, 2011 - by

Why EXFO May Be About to Take Off

Don’t just ask, “How much inventory?” Ask, “What kind?”

View full post on Fool.com: The Motley Fool


Posted on October 9, 2011 - by

where i can find some informations about the cost per day of unused airliners for major Company?

it’s for a studying case of business strategy (that is focused on Air Tahiti Nui).
If you also know where I could find information about charter airliner market, the second hand airliners market (if it exists), and finally the price of an Airbus A340-300.
If you can directly answers, thank you for giving your sources.
Thanks.


Posted on September 24, 2011 - by

A few thoughts about the Fed

AS THE headline promises, here are a few quick thoughts about monetary policy.

1) I mentioned yesterday that given the intensity of the political uproar over monetary policy of late, the Fed would likely be even more reluctant than normal to take action in the months leading up to the 2012 election. That means the Fed is quickly running out of opportunities to make big, near-term course corrections to policy. And that means that this, via Tim Duy, is disconcerting:

Nathan Sheets, who retired as director of the Federal Reserve‘s international affairs group this summer, said he believes the central bank will pause for a while after taking unconventional steps in August and September to bring down long-term interest rates as it assesses the impact of its actions.

“I wouldn’t expect at its November meeting the Fed is going to roll out some additional package,” he said in an interview.

The Fed isn’t leaving itself much time to act.

2) The Fed isn’t the only institution that can conduct “monetary policy”. The Treasury can, too. Douglas Irwin recently published a paper showing that the Treasury’s decision to sterilise gold inflows from 1936 to 1938 had a sharply contractionary effect on monetary policy, pulling the American economy into the “recession within a depression”. James Hamilton notes that during QE2 the Treasury ramped up its issuance of long-term Treasuries, essentially cancelling out the impact of the Fed’s purchases of same. Mr Hamilton goes on to note that during the original “Operation Twist”, the Fed and the Treasury were cooperating. If Fed and Treasury policy continue to be at odds with each other, then new Fed purchases may be even less effective than the 1960s version.

3) Monetary policy works through a number of mechanisms. As the Fed has responded to the crisis, it has become clear that Ben Bernanke places a big emphasis on the impact of the Fed’s market operations on interest rates and, through them, on the economy. Some monetary economists argue that this policy channel is less important and less powerful than the Fed’s influence on expectation. When Fed purchases have a strong impact on the economy, for instance, that seems largely to be due to the signaling power those purchases have and the resulting shift in market expectations.

There is ample support for this line of thinking in the literature (consider these two very recent papers, for instance). Just last month, monetary economist Michael Woodford argued forcefully in the Financial Times that the Fed was falling short of its policy goals by declining to communicate clearly where it wants the economy to go and what actions are likely to be taken when to get it there.

There are signs of an ongoing debate within the Federal Open Market Committee concerning how to deploy these tools. The change in the Fed’s language in August hinting that it would likely not raise rates for the next two years represented a—short, halting—step toward greater deployment of the expectations channel. Two things seem clear to me, however. First, it makes little sense to argue that monetary policy is impotent when the Fed has scarcely touched its strongest weapon. And second, to the extent that the Fed’s move this weak emphasised its focus on a portfolio-balance model of monetary policy rather than an expectations-based outlook, there’s plenty there to account for market disappointment.

The Fed can and should do more, but it’s far from clear that it will.

View full post on Free exchange


Posted on July 17, 2011 - by

A few things to remember about debt

THIS week, The Economist has quite a lot of material on the crisis in Europe, including a cover that deliberately evokes an earlier cover from another dangerous period. Both the Buttonwood column and the Economics focus compare current debt troubles to the early 1990s crisis in Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (which ended with the ejection of several prominent members). They provide a reminder that history’s big, successful fiscal consolidations are almost always supported by a big jump in foreign demand, which is usually related to a decline in the indebted country’s currency. That’s bad news for Europe, of course, since euro-zone members can’t devalue to help facilitate fiscal consolidation. But it’s actually worse than that; single currency or no, big economies will struggle to rely on foreign demand while cutting their debts because every other economy will be hoping to do the exact same thing. When everyone is deleveraging, the export route to growth (or tolerably tame contraction) amid austerity is cut off.

Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff identify three periods in recent history when the world found itself in this situation, in which indebtedness was high across all of the rich world. The first corresponds to the debt burdens of the First World War and the Depression. These debts often led to defaults or even hyperinflations, and they roiled global politics and economics for two decades. The second debt spike is associated with the Second World War. After the miserable experience of the first debt exposion, rich economies tried a different strategy the second time around. They locked lenders—banks and households—into forced saving through a broad arrangement of financial and capital controls, then eroded the debts away with moderate inflation until they were gone. 

Comes now the third debt spike, which is the largest yet. What will the advanced economies do? They will try austerity, but with debt levels extraordinarily high and the growth outlook poor, the public tolerance for tight budgets will probably disappear before the debts do. They could try to export their problems, but with economies responsible for over half of global output all cutting back simultaneously it won’t work.

Just looking at the historical record, then, we’d expect one of two things to happen. Either rich world countries will begin moving aggressively to create captive markets for their debt, or we’ll begin to see economies stumble down the more chaotic path to crisis and default: the road taken in the 1920s and 1930s.

The choice will hit first in the euro zone due to the limitations of the single currency and higher levels of debt. We see in the attempt to arm-twist banks into a “voluntary” rollover of Greek debt the early signs of a move toward repression. But repression won’t work without balanced budgets and moderate inflation. The more Europe pushes for the former, the less they get of the latter, particularly with the European Central Bank tightening the screws. It seems, then, that all options but one have been shut off. 

Europe is facing defaults—several, probably. The euro zone can survive them if it moves aggressively to prepare for them. But the longer it pretends that defaults aren’t inevitable, the more likely it is to face another period of financial chaos and hardship.

View full post on Free exchange


Posted on April 24, 2011 - by

What S&P had to say about taxes

BOTH Paul Krugman and Ezra Klein argue that America is lightly taxed, relative either to other countries or to history. But why take it from them? Here’s what Standard & Poor’s had to say the day they assigned a negative outlook to America’s AAA credit rating: 

The U.S. public sector consistently uses a smaller share of national income than the public sectors of most ‘AAA’ rated countries, and smaller than those of its closest peers, implying greater revenue flexibility. Political considerations aside, from an economic perspective, the U.S. public sector’s smaller share of national income suggests to us there could be room for the U.S. to raise taxes or increase other government revenue while remaining competitive. We believe that this flexibility also enhances the U.S.’s ability to pay.

Of course, our ability to pay isn’t the issue. S&P lowered its outlook because it questioned our willingness to pay.

View full post on Free exchange


Posted on April 24, 2011 - by

Learn about case studies on extraordinary business?


Posted on April 18, 2011 - by

is there any case study (over 5 pages) about the real life of a leader in business?

free for charge


Posted on January 27, 2011 - by

The Fed remains worried about growth

YESTERDAY, the Federal Reserve released its first policy statement of the new year, and observers learned a few things. First, the Federal Open Market Committee remains wary about the weakness of the American economy:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in December confirms that the economic recovery is continuing, though at a rate that has been insufficient to bring about a significant improvement in labor market conditions. Growth in household spending picked up late last year, but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Business spending on equipment and software is rising, while investment in nonresidential structures is still weak. Employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. The housing sector continues to be depressed. Although commodity prices have risen, longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable, and measures of underlying inflation have been trending downward.

I think the economic data that was coming in through December moved expectations from too pessimistic to perhaps a little too optimistic. Recent datapoints have been a little off—jobless claims have yet to hit the sub-400,000 level touched in late December, durable goods orders have softened a bit, and home prices are disappointing (though the housing figures should be treated with caution). The underlying trend in the numbers is clearly toward an accelerating recovery, but even a 4% real growth rate in 2011, which is possible, implies a long period of economic slack ahead.

Secondly, the shift in the make-up of the FOMC has not meaningfully altered the commitment to current policy, at least not yet. With the new year, perpetual dissenter Thomas Hoenig lost his voting status, but demand-side sceptics like Narayana Kocherlakota and Richard Fisher gained a vote. But the Fed’s policy has not changed—the plan to purchase $600 billion in additional assets remains on track and the language on extended low rates is still in place—and indeed, the statement was supported unanimously for the first time in ages.

What remains uncertain is how this policy path will develop as the year proceeds. If commodity prices rise into the summer, will the consensus on the FOMC stand? It would be surprising if such a rise led to a big increase in core inflation given the huge slack in the labour market, but it’s difficult to hold back rate increases when headline inflation jumpts to near 3%. If the unemployment rate does begin to drop meaningfully, will disputes arise over just where the new natural rate lies?

For now, the Fed’s path remains easy. With unemployment too high and inflation too low, the central bank should adopt an aggressively expansionary approach. But can Ben Bernanke keep the hawks in line as recovery continues? We’ll have to see.

View full post on Free exchange