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Posted on May 10, 2012 - by

Can someone help me with this Business Management Assignment?

Question 1
Indicate whether Google makes use of internal or external recruitment and briefly explain why they apply the specific source of recruitment?

Question 2
Explain the various steps in the selection process and indicate how Google makes use of each relevant step.

Question 3
Do you think Google’s recruitment process is successful? Explain your answer

Question 4
Does Google exercise placement and induction practices with regard to successful employment candidates? Explain your answer.

Question 5
Google offers employees incredible employment benefits, name 4 benefits listed in the case study that you would receive if you were to work for this company.

Thanks for your time.


Posted on May 9, 2012 - by

No way out

THE conventional wisdom that emerged immediately after Europe’s weekend elections—that voters may have forced Europe into a new crisis reckoning—seems to have been correct. Greece is struggling to put together a government and whatever government eventually emerges will probably press for a renegotiation of its bail-out deal. Euro-zone officials are saying that this is out of the question. Odds of a Greek departure from the euro zone appear to be rising sharply; Intrade now puts the chance of exit in 2012 at close to 40%, up from 22% a week ago. Markets are shuddering at the possibility; European equities are dropping like stones, yields around the periphery are jumping—Spain’s 10-year yield is back above 6%—and German yields are sinking to record lows. Big trouble is brewing.

The talk is increasingly turning to how Greece might fare upon leaving the euro-zone. Some are speculating that with Greece in the midst of a deepening depression and suffering from full-on capital flight, there is little risk to calling it quits. Indeed, if one is going to have an economic disaster, one might as well get a depreciation out of the bargain.

I suspect this analysis is wrong. Yes, a depreciation would boost the competitiveness of Greek exports, but I’m not sure that would matter much in the chaos following on an exit. Both people and capital would make a mad rush for the exits once it became clear that Greece would be leaving. In such circumstances, currencies typically overshoot on the way down. A plunging drachma would create intense inflationary pressure. That would no doubt be exacerbated by Greek funding needs; despite deep austerity it continues to run a large deficit and the temptation to fund it through printing will be strong. Hyperinflation would be a real possibility. The political dynamics of such turmoil are difficult to foresee, but one suspects that fringe parties would only benefit from chaos. As The Economist has warned, Greece might well become a failed state upon leaving the euro zone. It might not, of course, but I’d put more money on disaster than salvation.

I suspect matters would worsen for the euro zone, as well. Some now argue that exposure to Greece has been reduced sufficiently that the rest of the single-currency area could cut the country loose without too much financial trouble. That might be right. The question is whether this particular genie, once released, could be contained. The stakes of such a gamble would be enormous. If there were contagion, and if markets attacked Ireland, Portugal, and perhaps Spain and Italy, thinking that they could be next, the euro zone might be overwhelmed and driven into chaotic collapse. That’s far from a certainty. Whether shaky markets could handle just a rise in the probability of such an outcome is entirely unclear.

Europe has tolerated the discomfort of the past few years because the alternatives might possibly be far, far worse. But consistent failure to really address the crisis has steadily increased the temptation to roll the dice. Eventually, one party or another may decide the bet is worth the risk. And that is a frightening thought.

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Posted on May 8, 2012 - by

Enterprise Case Studies @abcol: Steven Bedford.wmv


Enterprise case studies @abcol – Steven Bedford, former TV student, describes his journey to setting up his own successful business. Enterprising stuff to inspire learners and others to set up their own business…


Posted on May 6, 2012 - by

Not countercyclical enough, then or now

PAUL KRUGMAN is not very critical of the fiscal policy stance of the European periphery prior to this crisis:

But Ken [Rogoff] is basically buying into the German-preferred frame that it’s all about fiscal irresponsibility, which is completely wrong for everyone [except Greece] — above all for Spain, the heart of the crisis. … It’s really frustrating that a completely, demonstrably false narrative about the crisis continues to dominate the discourse.

Interestingly, economists from the periphery are more critical. Here is Irish economist Philip Lane and his conclusion in a paper (together with Agustín Bénétrix) entitled “Fiscal Cyclicality and EMU”:

This paper has empirically examined the cyclical patterns in fiscal policy over 1980 to 2007 for the set of EMU member countries. …[T]he clear deterioration in the cyclical conduct of fiscal policy after the creation of EMU is reflective of the weaker incentives to maintain fiscal discipline once inside the monetary union. In relation to the financial cycle, the additional infl uence of both credit growth and net capital flows on fiscal outcomes supports the case for taking a broad view of the cyclical conduct of fi scal policy and underlines the difficulties in assessing the true structural fiscal position at any point in time.

In overall terms, insufficiently-countercyclical fiscal patterns during the pre-crisis years (the failure to run sufficiently-large surpluses) was surely a contributory factor to the subsequent crisis … In relation to the current reforms of European economic and fiscal governance, one key message is that improving the cyclical conduct of fiscal policy for EMU member countries is an important policy objective … In addition, there is a clear linkage between the monitoring of excessive imbalances and fiscal surveillance, in view of the sensitivity of the fiscal cycle to the financial cycle.

This is not to say that the German narrative is correct, of course: fiscal policy is just one of many factors. And it certainly is not correct that austerity is helpful now. But austerity isn’t the answer right now precisely because in a monetary union, each country has to run its own (non-monetary) stabilisation policy. Besides policy tools like regulation, this does include fiscal policy: in downturns, countries have to run appropriately large fiscal deficits; during booms, however, countries need to run massive surpluses—especially if the boom in question, like those in Ireland and Spain, is built on real estate, banking and capital inflows (what Mr Lane calls the “financial cycle”). Such financial boom periods affect fiscal revenues temporarily, and are likely to go into reverse gear once the boom ends:

[A]sset price booms do not only raise revenues from asset-related taxes but also lead to generalised revenue growth, due to the wealth effect of increasing asset values on consumption. … [A] current account deficit should improve revenues from indirect taxes, since net capital in flows finance a higher level of domestic absorption …

Credit growth affects revenues through several channels. First, the positive impact of credit growth on domestic asset and property prices improves revenues through the direct and indirect channels … Second, credit growth may fuel a greater volume of asset market turnover, which raises revenues from transactions taxes. Third, if credit growth is associated with a shift in the composition of production towards the construction sector and other nontradables, this may alter the composition of the tax base to the extent sectors differ in the distribution of income between wages and profi ts and in composition of spending between taxable domestic spending and non-taxed exports. Fourth, credit growth may be associated with infl ation and/or real exchange rate appreciation (an increase in the relative price of nontradables) and thereby raise revenues, since tax systems are not fully infl ation-indexed.

What would have happened, had Spain and Ireland run appropriate surpluses? Matthew O’Brien is sceptical that it would have made much of a difference. Olivier Blanchard is somewhat cautious, too, albeit regarding the effect of fiscal policy on the current account, not the business cycle. I am more optimistic, especially if we include other regulatory tools aimed at real estate and banking. Mr Lane further argues that it would have increased the fiscal room available during the crisis, too. But it seems hard to make a macroeconomically convincing case that Spanish and Irish fiscal policy before this crisis was appropriate—despite the surpluses.

The insight that the fiscal policy stance in the periphery prior to this crisis was insufficiently countercyclical also allows for a more convincing argument against the German emphasis on austerity: if they criticise the periphery’s fiscal policy before the crisis on macroeconomic grounds, they should be in favour of more fiscal stimulus and less austerity now.

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Posted on May 6, 2012 - by

S. Dheenadhayalan on Jaya TV, Jaya Tv, Paarvaigal Palavidham in Jaya TV, S. Dheenadhayalan in Media


Business case study, paarvaigal palavidham, paarvaigal palavidham in Jaya Tv, Business case study in Jaya Tv, S. Dheenadhayalan in Jaya Tv, S. Dheenadhayalan Lead – hi Managing Director in Jaya TV


Posted on May 5, 2012 - by

NVE Beats on Both Top and Bottom Lines

Just the facts, Fool.

View full post on Fool.com: The Motley Fool


Posted on May 4, 2012 - by

SMB Case Study in Australia – Overview


Posted on May 3, 2012 - by

A workable solution is a (relatively) cheap solution

IN A Tuesday post on potential alternatives to austerity in Europe, I wrote:

What, then, are the alternatives to austerity? Well, first up would be an integration that would help break the diabolical loop now gutting the periphery. Creating a euro-zone-wide safe asset and a euro-zone-wide set of institutions to stand behind damaged banks would help accomplish that. America doesn’t expect Delaware to shoulder the costs of failures of banks headquartered in Delaware. That’s an important contributor to the stability of the American federal system. The euro-zone must recognise that it is the failure to build appropriate euro-zone-wide institutions—equal in scope to the considerations and resources of the central bank—that is contributing to soaring yields around the periphery and creating the illusion of the need for dramatic austerity in places that could do without it.

Tyler Cowen says I fail to put forward a workable solution:

I call this the “Germany pays for everything and accepts all the risk of moral hazard” approach. Potential German liabilities could run in the trillions of euros and the “ball and chain” lasts forever. I know all about Connecticut and Mississippi, but without a common electorate, not to mention a common national identity, I don’t see how this is possible. Keep in mind that Eurozone-wide deposit insurance in essence serves as an implicit guarantee to the parent national governments as well, for Modigliani-Miller-like reasons.

This strikes me as mistaken for a few reasons. First, the recommendations in the cited paragraph are workable in the sense that they’re among the future policy shifts most likely to occur. I think it’s far more likely that the euro zone gets a eurobond in the next year or so than that it solves its competitiveness problems.

Second, Germans no doubt see solutions like this as putting them on the hook for trillions in potential losses, but I think they’re wrong to do so. The problem at which the above solution takes aim is the fact that the euro zone has slipped into a bad equilibrium, in which loss of confidence in the sovereign affects the banks which affects the sovereign. If the periphery manages to escape that equilibrium the total costs of the crisis fall dramatically. And my recommendation goes a very long way toward achieving that. That’s partly because of fiscal risk-sharing, but mostly because a euro-zone-wide backstop will be fully supported by a central bank. Ireland failed in its game of chicken with markets because it had no printing presses to support its blanket bank guarantee.

I am hopeful of progress on this front because ultimately it is the cheapest way to escape the crisis—far cheaper than adopting a massive system of fiscal transfers. And the Germans are already working on ways to develop eurobonds that should minimise moral hazard.

Mr Cowen is right, however, that the lack of shared national identity is a problem. It is primarily a problem because it encourages governments to adopt a moralistic view of the crisis. Germans are tempted to think that their relative success is due to Spanish sloth or Italian corruption, which reinforces support for “punitive” efforts to address the crisis. Spanish and Italian workers resent the moralistic German approach and resist austerity, striking in opposition to cuts and so on. This reinforces the view in the core that the south is full of lazy, state-dependent leeches.

Fine. Mr Cowen implies that perhaps there is no alternative. That’s no good; in my view, continuing on the current path is tantamount to advocating for a break-up. My solution is certainly cheaper than that! And, I continue to think, more likely to occur. My broader point is that the dynamics Mr Cowen cites—the problem of a lack of common national identity—will in hindsight make the end of the euro zone look inevitable. It isn’t. Men and women are responsible for their actions, and different actions would make survival of the crisis far, far more likely, which would in turn buy substantially more time for the process of European cultural and political integration. Every ECB meeting in which Mario Draghi stands by and does nothing is a preventable step along the road to the end.

Incidentally, Mr Cowen’s suggestion that inflation well above 4% would be necessary to fix the euro zone’s problems seems dubious to me, or at least in need of supportive evidence. At any rate there is no excuse not to try 4% inflation, given the probable magnitude of the costs of break-up.

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Posted on May 2, 2012 - by

The Megatrends Driving Our Future

Inflection Point Capital Management introduces investors to the trends it believes will require a shift in investment strategy.

View full post on Fool.com: The Motley Fool


Posted on May 2, 2012 - by

Case Study #1: The Broken Window


A group discussion about the case study of a boy who threw the brick on the window of the baker’s shop, breaks it and affects the business of the baker and the glass makers. The group scrutinizes the issue with economic point of view–secondary effects, scarcity, opportunity costs, etc, and the various insights from the group members. Case Study per se was narrated by Mytch Evangelista. ©2012 by Mytch Evangelista.